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PAMMELA S. QUINN†  
ABSTRACT 
    By reference to a detailed analysis of recent major 
corruption scandals that have plagued the IOC and 
FIFA, this Article examines the ways in which large 
multi-national corporate sponsors sometimes exercise 
private regulatory authority in the international sports 
arena. Through their contract relationships with 
sporting organizations, corporate sponsors potentially 
have the capacity to act as strong regulators. When 
major corruption scandals have emerged, sponsors 
have taken a variety of actions that run the gamut from 
tepid criticism to withdrawing from the sponsoring 
arrangements. Yet, they ultimately have been far less 
effective regulators than one might expect given their 
financial importance to the international sports 
organizations with which they are affiliated. 
Ultimately, various structural obstacles appear to 
stand in the way of corporations fulfilling their full 
potential to exert strong influence.  
INTRODUCTION 
Scandal dogs sport at every level: from very young Little League 
players who are accused of lying about their ages;1 to the perennial 
charges of players being illegally paid to play at the collegiate level;2 
 
© 2017 Pammela S. Quinn. 
† Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law 
 1.  See, e.g., Dan Le Batard, Little League Cheating Scandal, ESPN THE MAGAZINE 
(Dec. 24, 2001), http://www.espn.com/espn/news/story?page=Mag15detour. 
 2.  See, e.g., Dave Davies, NPR, Fresh Air: The Illegal Procedure of Paying College 
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and the ongoing controversy over the National Football League’s 
handling of scientific evidence regarding concussion risks,3 which has 
recently given rise not only to troubling news stories but also to a major 
Hollywood movie. There is simply no escaping major controversy 
when high-profile sporting events and personalities are involved. Yet, 
while scandal may always seem to go hand in glove with high-profile 
sports, the international sports arena in particular appears to be 
perpetually rife with serious problems at the very highest levels. 
Stories of major corruption scandals involving international sporting 
events seem to arise with nearly as much frequency as stories about the 
events and athletes themselves.  
The plague of corruption infecting the highest levels of 
international sports organizations and events may be directly 
attributable to the fact that such organizations are operating beyond the 
national plane. As is true with respect to transnational enterprises more 
generally, the transnational/trans-regulatory nature of international 
sports makes them far more complicated and challenging to regulate 
than is the case for similar organizations that operate in   a purely 
domestic context. While “political entities … [have traditionally] had 
a virtual monopoly over economic regulation, each in their own 
territor[ies],”4 when people or entities cross borders and becomes 
international in their scope, regulatory efforts become difficult for any 
one state to control. As a result, “public law, as either substantive rules 
or as systems of governance, has proven increasingly unable to 
respond efficiently to the problems of [transnational] governance.”5     
Private regulation—the regulation of one private entity by 
another—has emerged in the academic literature as a potential solution 
to this regulatory dilemma. This notion found its way into comedian 
John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight segment about the corruption scandal 
that plagued the Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
 
Athletes (aired Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/28/148610494/the-illegal-
procedure-of-paying-college-athletes (reviewing JAMES DALE & JOSH LUCHS, ILLEGAL 
PROCEDURE: A SPORTS AGENT COMES CLEAN ON THE DIRTY BUSINESS OF COLLEGE FOOTBALL 
(2012)). 
 3.  See Jeanne Marie Laskas, Bennet Omalu, Concussions and the NFL: How One 
Doctor Changed Football Forever, GQ (Sept. 14, 2009), http://www.gq.com/story/nfl-
players-brain-dementia-study-memory-concussions; see also Lauren Larson, Watch Will 
Smith Take On the NFL in This Chilling Trailer for Concussion, GQ (Aug. 31, 2015) 
http://www.gq.com/story/trailer-concussion-will-smith. 
 4.  Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of 
Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1743 
(2007). 
 5.  Id. at 1745. 
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(“FIFA”) in 2015.6 Oliver called upon the organization’s corporate 
sponsors to take action and force the resignation of FIFA President 
Joseph “Sepp” Blatter. Perhaps only half-jokingly he referred to the 
organization’s corporate sponsors as “the only group even more 
powerful than world government.”7  
Indeed, FIFA’s sponsors include some of the largest multi-
national enterprises in the world, including Coca-Cola, Budweiser, 
Adidas, and Hyundai/Kia. While traditionally viewed as subjects of 
regulation, large multi-national corporations also possess enormous 
potential to wield regulatory authority over FIFA and other 
international sporting bodies and events that they sponsor.  
And occasionally they have harnessed this power. The John 
Hancock Life Insurance Company was a worldwide Olympics sponsor 
in the 1990s.8 When a bidding scandal over the 2002 Salt Lake City 
Games emerged, the company’s CEO David D’Alessandro demanded 
that International Olympics Committee (“IOC”) President Juan 
Antonio Samaranch resign.9 D’Alessandro believes that his measures 
were directly responsible for the IOC’s becoming more transparent at 
the time.10   
With respect to the recent FIFA scandal, too, some sponsors did 
do as Oliver suggested. Corporate sponsors serve as a major source of 
cash for FIFA, which earned $1.6 billion from sponsorship money in 
 
 6.  After allegations of corruption emerged in the selection of host countries for two 
upcoming World Cups, dozens of FIFA executives, including those at the very top of the 
organization, were investigated by the FBI and eventually indicted by the Justice Department 
between May and December 2015. See, e.g., Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, 
BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066. The BBC 
article noted that while DOJ’s “investigation was initially sparked by the bidding process for 
the Russia 2018 and Qatar 2022 World Cups,” it was eventually “widened to look back at 
Fifa’s dealings over the past 20 years.” Id. FIFA’s selection of Qatar has also come under 
attack given the human rights problems emerging there. Shona Gosh, Why FIFA’s Sponsors 
Haven’t Quit, PR WEEK (June 2, 2015), http://www.prweek.com/article/1349704/why-fifas-
sponsors-havent-quit#YIxmy5wQWdUX095V.99 (“Its selection of Qatar as the 2022 World 
Cup host has also been heavily criticized after hundreds of migrant workers were revealed to 
have died during stadium construction work.”). 
 7.  See Lisa de Moraes, John Oliver Vows To Drink Bud Light Lime If World Cup 
Sponsors Boot FIFA Chief – Update, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (June 1, 2015), 
http://deadline.com/2015/06/john-oliver-fifa-sepp-blatter-budweiser-world-cup-last-week-
tonight-video-1201435345/. 
 8.  Richard Sandomir, Sponsors React Meekly to Sepp Blatter’s Resignation, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 2, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/sports/soccer/sponsors-react-meekly-
to-sepp-blatters-resignation.html?_r=0. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
9_QUINN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/17  8:13 AM 
224 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 32:221 
 
the four-years leading up to the 2014 World Cup.11  Nearly half of its 
money comes from just six top sponsoring companies, two of which 
(Sony and Emirates) ended their sponsorships in 2014 during a flurry 
of bad press surrounding the corruption allegations.12   
On the other hand, most IOC and FIFA sponsors are more notable 
for their lack of response to these corruption scandals. Even with 
respect to those that did take action, their responses are not necessarily 
very effective. In the case of Sony and Emirates, the companies did not 
even mention the corruption scandal directly in announcing their 
decisions not to renew sponsorship deals. Further, the impact of their 
departures are mooted by other competitors’ jumping in to take their 
spots.13 And other major sponsors, such as Visa and Coca-Cola, who 
made public statements calling on FIFA to take action, took no 
financial action or other steps that might have exerted real pressure in 
connection with their sponsorship roles. 
Using case studies of corruption and corporate sponsor responses 
to scandals in the IOC and FIFA, this Article considers broadly how 
and when corporate sponsors effectively serve as private regulators of 
 
 11.  Mike Esterl, FIFA’s Corporate Sponsors Welcome Resignation of Sepp Blatter, 
WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fifas-corporate-sponsors-welcome-
resignation-of-sepp-blatter-1433277626 (“Sponsors also spend money on TV ads on networks 
around the world that air soccer matches. Overall, FIFA took in $5.72 billion in the 2014 
cycle.”). 
 12.  Id. Sony terminated its sponsorship worth $277 million “saying the expense of 
sponsorship may become a burden in the future for the technology company.” Polly Mosendz, 
Sony Drops FIFA Sponsorship Amid Corruption Scandal, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://www.newsweek.com/sony-drops-fifa-sponsorship-amid-corruption-scandal-288443. 
Emirates indicated that it would be interested in renewing its sponsorship deal once the 
corruption issues had been dealt with. Emirates Keen on Sponsoring Fifa Once Corruption 
Scandal Is Cleared Up, THE NATIONAL (June 21, 2016), 
http://www.thenational.ae/business/aviation/emirates-keen-on-sponsoring-fifa-once-
corruption-scandal-is-cleared-up (“‘I’d like to think that when it’s all sorted out we get back 
in because it’s great for us, we’re so football orientated,’ [Emirates President] said.”). Other 
“second-tier” sponsors followed suit. Owen Gibson, Scandal-Hit FIFA Loses Three More 
Major Sponsors, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/jan/23/fifa-lose-three-sponsors-castrol-
continental-tyres-johnson-and-johnson (“Three of FIFA’s sponsors during the 2014 World 
Cup in Brazil have joined Sony and Emirates in declining to renew their contracts with the 
scandal-hit world governing body. Castrol, Continental Tyres and Johnson & Johnson – so-
called second-tier sponsors that had a high-profile presence in Brazil – have confirmed they 
have not renewed their deals.”). 
 13.  As of July 2015, Qatar Airways reported that it was in latter stages of negotiating a 
sponsorship agreement with FIFA (as a replacement for Emirates). Aaron Flanagan, Qatar 
Airways Still Plan World Cup Sponsorship Despite Revelations of Alleged FIFA Corruption, 
MIRROR (June 2, 2015), http://www.mirror.co.uk/sport/football/news/qatar-airways-still-plan-
world-5808056. 
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corruption in international sports. The Article also describes many of 
the obstacles that currently stand in the way of effective regulation by 
corporate sponsors. After examining the literature considering private 
regulation in the transnational/international sphere generally, the 
Article considers what factors may have encouraged sponsors to 
engage in regulatory responses and discouraged others from behaving 
similarly. The Article concludes with thoughts about the overall 
potential of private regulation to help stem corruption in international 
sports organizations, despite some serious limitations.   
I. THE RISE OF PRIVATE REGULATION 
Legal regulation is often viewed as primarily within the purview 
of public lawmakers. Yet, as crossing borders becomes routine and 
globalization becomes the norm, regulation becomes difficult for 
public actors to control effectively. As a result, “public law, as either 
substantive rules or as systems of governance, has proven increasingly 
unable to respond efficiently to the problems of the governance of 
economic relations.”14 The result is that “[a] diverse group of actors 
today vie with national governments for the right to exert power and 
authority . . . . Of these, the modern multinational corporation (MNC) 
is perhaps the most powerful.”15 
A deep scholarly literature describes the regulatory difficulties 
that arise when misconduct becomes multinational in scope.16 A 
variety of scholars from different academic disciplines have 
challenged the traditional public law framework that classically 
permeates scholarly analyses of regulation.17 These scholars analyze 
private law’s potential as a substitute for, or helpmate to, public law in 
 
 14.  Backer, supra note 4, at 1745. 
 15.  David Antony Detomasi, The Multinational Corporation and Global Governance: 
Modelling Global Policy Networks, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 321, 321 (2007); see also Peter J. Spiro, 
Constraining Global Corporate Power, 46 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 1101, 1103 (2013) (“To the 
extent that states are less able to regulate them, then, globalization empowers multinational 
corporations”).  
 16.  See, e.g., PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 123-72 
(1999); Steven Lukes, Five Fables About Human Rights, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (Stephen 
Shute & Susan Harley eds., 1993); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A 
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 446 (2001). 
 17.  Backer, supra note 4, at 1745–1746 (citing SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND 
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 1128-43(2004); Mitchell F. Crusto, Green 
Business: Should We Revoke Corporate Charters for Environmental Violations?, 63 LA. L. 
REV. 175, 241 (2003); A.J. Natale, Expansion of Parent Corporate Shareholder Liability 
Through the Good Samaritan Doctrine: A Parent Corporation’s Duty to Provide a Safe 
Workplace for Employees of its Subsidiary, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 717, 734-36 (1988)). 
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situations “[w]here regulation does not exist (in form or fact), or where 
markets in law break down or are inefficient.”18 Among other things, 
scholars pursuing this kind of research agenda study how and when 
private actors19—including corporations, civil society, the media, and 
individuals—separately and together can create a system of rule-
making and rule-enforcement that may be more effective than public 
lawmaking standing alone.20 
A significant amount of scholarly research along these lines has 
recently been published in the transnational corporate law and business 
literatures. For instance, many projects have examined the potential of 
supply chain contracting to serve as an effective private regulatory 
mechanism.21 The hypothesis being tested in the supply-chain 
literature involves the potential of contracts to impact positively the 
labor conditions enjoyed by persons working  in suppliers’ factories 
located in developing economies where serious human rights 
violations occur with depressing frequency.22 Specifically, companies 
at the top of supply chains arguably can regulate others in the chain by 
insisting on contractual commitments by their suppliers that they 
undertake to provide better and safer working conditions than they 
 
 18.  Backer, supra note 4, at 1749. 
 19.  Larry Catá Backer suggests there are four principal actors who function separately 
and in tandem as private regulators: (1) corporations and other enterprises; (2) civil society, 
primarily economic and human rights NGOs, (3) the media, and (4) consumers (of both media 
and market goods). Id. at 1748–49.  
 20.  Id. at 1749; Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, Transnational Corporations and Public 
Accountability, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 234, 245–57 (2004) (detailing the efforts to regulate 
corporations globally by states, international organizations, NGOs, and corporations 
themselves); Rhys Jenkins, Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in the Global 
Economy, U.N. RES. INST. FOR SOC. DEV. 1 (Apr. 2001) (describing the historic development 
of corporate codes); Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Codes of Conduct to the Next 
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 4–5 (2005) (describing emergence of corporate codes of 
conduct); Spiro, supra note 15, at 1104-09 (describing private regulatory approaches to 
disciplining transnational corporate behavior). But see Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-
State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 31, 33 (criticizing the notion of “non-state governance” 
as “conceptually,” “empirically” and “normatively unattractive”). 
 21.  See, e.g., RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: 
PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013); Richard M. Locke, Can 
Global Brands Create Just Supply Chains?, BOSTON REV. (May 21, 2013), 
http://bostonreview.net/forum/can-global-brands-create-just-supply-chains-richard-locke; 
Kish Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747 (2014); Spiro, 
supra note 15 (noting generally that “voluntary initiatives have come under fire for a lack of 
enforcement architecture” and specifically citing workplace tragedies in Bangladesh that 
revealed weaknesses in supply chain regulatory initiatives). 
 22.  See, e.g., Tansy Hoskins, Supply chain audits fail to detect abuses, says report, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-
business/2016/jan/14/supply-chain-audits-failing-detect-abuses-report; Locke, supra note 21. 
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would be legally required to provide within their home jurisdictions. 
Such private contractual provisions can, in theory, fill public 
regulatory gaps at the supplier end of the chain.23 Whether in fact this 
form of private regulation is feasible or effective at offsetting public 
regulatory failures is debatable,24 but it has been embraced as a serious 
alternative in situations where public regulation is especially 
unrealistic.25  
In the field of environmental law, too, analysis of private 
contracts reveals the potential for private parties to regulate their 
contracting partners via the contract relationship. Professor Michael 
Vandenberg, a leading scholar in this area, reports on “recent empirical 
research” suggesting that a variety of private regulatory initiatives are 
positively affecting “environmental behavior and environmental 
quality.”26 
Vandenbergh has described the practice wherein contracting 
parties incorporate public law environmental standards as terms of 
their private agreements, such as in credit agreements and insurance 
policies.27 These provisions typically make it a contractual condition 
for borrowers or insureds to comply with environmental regulations – 
and sometimes with even stricter standards than those already required 
by law.28 The existence of such contractual provisions, Vandenbergh 
argues, means that the party imposing the requirement “has incentives 
to ensure that [the party subject to it] does not violate the law or engage 
 
 23.  See, e.g., Parella, supra note 21 (criticizing current approaches for failing to take into 
account misaligned incentives of suppliers and their MNE buyers and suggesting alternatives 
that incorporate some elements of traditional public legal regulation). 
 24.  See, e.g., Backer, supra note 4, at 1739-84. 
 25.  Recent events, such as the Rana Plaza tragedy, suggest that dangerous workplace 
conditions pose a real threat to vulnerable workers worldwide. See Jana Kasperkevic, Rana 
Plaza collapse: workplace dangers persist three years later, reports find, THE GUARDIAN 
(May 31, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/31/rana-plaza-bangladesh-
collapse-fashion-working-conditions. See also, e.g., John G. Ruggie, Commentary: Quo 
Vadis? Unsolicited Advice to Business and Human Rights Treaty Sponsors, INS’T. FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS & BUS. (Sept. 9, 2014) (discussing contentious debate over multilateral treaty on topic 
of business and human rights); Larry Catá Backer, Regulating Multinational Corporations: 
Trends, Challenges, and Opportunities, 22 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 1, 3 (2015) (same).  
 26.  Michael Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV.129, 
139 (2013). 
 27.  Michael Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 
2030-32 (2005). 
 28.  Id. at 2045 (“A sample of the credit agreements filed with the SEC suggests that firms 
filed more than 1,500 in 2001, and more than 70% of these credit agreements include 
environmental provisions.”). 
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in liability creating behavior.”29 While it is unclear, as an empirical 
matter, how frequently lenders actually insist on influencing borrowers 
to comply (or not) with environmental obligations, “it is clear that 
lenders have incentives to select low-risk borrowers, and often have 
incentives to demand regulatory compliance or over-compliance 
during the term of the loan. As a result, in many instances lenders have 
incentives to engage in traditionally public regulatory functions, 
including monitoring and enforcement, implementation, standard 
setting, and dispute resolution.”30 “Lenders also include provisions in 
credit agreements that establish their right to monitor debtors during 
the term of the loan and to enforce regulatory compliance (e.g., by 
declaring noncompliance to be a breach of representation and an event 
of default).”31 
As research across disciplines develops, debate is only 
intensifying  on the basic question of whether and how contracting can 
become a feasible mechanism for addressing transnational regulatory 
gaps across the board.32 Yet, it is clear that some forms of private 
regulation are increasingly being viewed as serious alternatives to 
public regulation—particularly in contexts where public regulation is 
especially unrealistic.33  
Contracts between corporate sponsors and international sporting 
organizations have the potential to serve a similar regulatory function. 
The financial dependence of FIFA34 and the IOC35 on large 
corporate sponsors means that, at least in theory, sponsors may have 
 
 29.  Id. at 2052. 
 30.  Id. at 2053. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  See, e.g., Locke, supra note 21 (concluding that, “[d]espite many good faith efforts 
over the past fifteen years, private regulation has had limited impact”); Parella, supra note 21 
(criticizing current approaches for failing to take into account misaligned incentives of 
suppliers and their MNE buyers and suggesting alternatives that incorporate some elements of 
traditional public legal regulation). 
 33.  See, e.g., Backer, supra note 4. 
 34.  Corporate sponsors have served as a major source of cash for FIFA, which earned 
$1.6 billion from sponsorship money in the four years leading up to the 2014 World Cup. Mike 
Esterl, FIFA’s Corporate Sponsors Welcome Resignation of Sepp Blatter, WALL ST. J. (June 
2, 2015) http://www.wsj.com/articles/fifas-corporate-sponsors-welcome-resignation-of-sepp-
blatter-1433277626 (“Sponsors also spend money on TV ads on networks around the world 
that air soccer matches. Overall, FIFA took in $5.72 billion in the 2014 cycle.”). 
 35.  Jere Longman, Potential Olympic Sponsors Said to Be Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 
1999) http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/21/sports/olympics-potential-olympic-sponsors-
said-to-be-uneasy.html (noting that sponsor money was critical to the ability of the United 
States to stage a full Winter Olympics). 
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significant leverage they can choose to utilize to combat corrupt 
behavior.36 Case studies suggest that this does sometimes, but not 
often, occur. 
II. CASE STUDIES: RESPONSES OF CORPORATE SPONSORS TO 
CORRUPTION SCANDALS IN THE IOC AND FIFA 
Two of the most high-profile international sports organizations – 
the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”)37 and the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (“FIFA”)38 – have been the 
subject of numerous corruption scandals over the past decades. Just 
last spring, allegations emerged that bribery may have helped to secure 
Tokyo’s winning bid for the 2020 Summer Olympics.39 While the 
suspicions of bribery ultimately proved unfounded, the allegations 
brought back memories of the scandal that rocked the 2002 Salt Lake 
City Games, in which members of the IOC took bribes from the Salt 
Lake Organizing Committee (“SLOC”) in the form of direct payments, 
land purchase agreements, tuition payments, and political campaign 
and charitable donations.40 Ultimately, twenty IOC members were 
 
 36.  To the extent that such leverage exists in fact, it might be written into the contracts 
that structure the sponsorship relationship, as in some of the examples from other fields 
discussed above, or, alternatively, might be exercised as part of that ongoing relationship 
outside its written terms. See infra Part 3 (arguing that regulatory influence by a stronger 
contracting partner may exist even when the contract terms do not reflect it. The formal 
contract terms in these contracts may, however, get in the way); see also Pammela S. Quinn, 
Regulation in the Shadows of Private Law, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. __ (forthcoming 
2017) (describing how the regulatory relationship between contracting parties might not be 
reflected in the terms of the formal contract). 
 37.  The IOC is an international NGO organized “in the form of an association with the 
status of a legal person, recognized by the Swiss Federal Council in accordance with an 
agreement entered into on 1 November 2000. Its seat is in Lausanne (Switzerland), the 
Olympic capital. The object of the IOC is to fulfill the mission, role and responsibilities as 




 38.  FIFA “is an association governed by Swiss law founded in 1904 and based in Zurich. 
It has 211 member associations and its goal, enshrined in its Statutes, is the constant 
improvement of football.” FIFA, About FIFA: Who We Are, http://www.fifa.com/about-
fifa/who-we-are/index.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2017). 
 39.  Japan Investigators Say No Bribery in Tokyo Olympic Payment, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 
2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37243012. 
 40.  Stephanie Grimes, Five Biggest Scandals in Winter Olympic History, L.V. REV.-J. 
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.reviewjournal.com/sports/5-biggest-scandals-winter-olympic-
history. 
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either expelled or sanctioned.41  
FIFA endured its own recent corruption scandal after allegations 
of bribery emerged in the selection of host countries for two upcoming 
World Cups. Ultimately, dozens of FIFA executives, including those 
at the very top of the organization, were indicted by the United States 
Department of Justice.42  
In the case of each of these scandals, corporate sponsors played a 
role in the response to the breaking allegations of corruption. In both 
cases, a few sponsors took action while most did not. Notably, 
however, with respect to those sponsors that did choose to act, the 
types of actions taken have varied fairly broadly. 
Corporate Sponsors’ Responses to the IOC Bribery Scandal 
When the bidding scandal over the 2002 Salt Lake City Games 
emerged, the John Hancock Life Insurance Company’s CEO David 
D’Alessandro publicly demanded resignations of various IOC 
members including the IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch.43 In 
making such demands, John Hancock did not simply terminate its 
relationship or pull its sponsoring dollars. Instead, the company took 
other concrete measures, such as taking the Olympics logo off of 
Hancock’s billboards and other advertising and, perhaps most 
significantly, freezing its purchase of $20 million in advertising during 
the NBC 2000 Summer Olympics coverage.44     
A few sponsors cited the scandal as part of decisions not to renew 
sponsorship deals.45 In addition, while the scandal was unfolding, there 
were reports that two potential Salt Lake City sponsors were skittish 
and refusing to finalize deals.46 
For the most part, however, sponsors were largely quiet while the 
scandal was unfolding.47 When John Hancock’s decision to suspend 
 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See, e.g., Fifa Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066. 
 43.  Sandomir, supra note 8. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Ameet Sachdev, Sponsors Say Scandal Didn’t Stain Olympics, CHI. TRIB., (Sept. 5, 
2000), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2000-09-05/business/0009050022_1_ioc-sydney-
games-winter-games (noting that IBM ended its 38-year relationship with the Olympics and 
that the scandal had affected UPS’s analysis of whether to renew). 
 46.  Longman, supra note 37. 
 47.  See, e.g., Stephen Wilson, Olympic Games: Salt Lake Inquiry Implicates 24, THE 
INDEPENDENT (Feb. 11, 1999), https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympic-games-salt-
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advertising negotiations was made public, the IOC’s Marketing 
Director Michael Payne was quick to report that Olympic sponsors 
were generally standing with the IOC during the crisis. Payne asserted 
that sponsors remained not just committed to the Olympic Games but 
also “are standing . . . behind the steps and action the IOC, Samaranch 
and the executive board are taking [in response to the bribery 
inquiry].”48 
Corporate Sponsors’ Responses to the FIFA Corruption Scandal 
The responses of sponsors in connection with the recent FIFA 
scandal were even more muted. Perhaps the most significant response 
was the refusal of two of FIFA’s “big six”49 sponsors (Sony and 
Emirates) to renew their sponsorship deals in 2014.50 A few other 
major sponsors, namely Visa and Coca-Cola, made public statements 
calling on FIFA to take action to resolve its corruption problems.51  
For the most part, however, FIFA sponsors have been criticized 
for their lack of response to the corruption scandal and, even with 
respect to those that did take action, with the lukewarm nature of the 
responses. Neither Sony nor Emirates discussed or cite directly the 
corruption scandal in announcing their decisions not to renew 
 
lake-inquiry-implicates-24-1070165.html. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Nearly half of FIFA’s sponsorship dollars comes from just six top sponsoring 
companies. Esterl, supra note 11. 
 50.  Sony terminated its sponsorship worth $277 million “saying the expense of 
sponsorship may become a burden in the future for the technology company.” Polly Mosendz, 
Sony Drops FIFA Sponsorship Amid Corruption Scandal, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:31 
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/sony-drops-fifa-sponsorship-amid-corruption-scandal-
288443; Emirates indicated that it would be interested in renewing its sponsorship deal once 
the corruption issues had been dealt with. Emirates Keen on Sponsoring Fifa Once Corruption 
Scandal Is Cleared Up, THE NATIONAL (June 10, 2016, 12:48 PM), 
http://www.thenational.ae/business/aviation/emirates-keen-on-sponsoring-fifa-once-
corruption-scandal-is-cleared-up (“‘I’d like to think that when it’s all sorted out we get back 
in because it’s great for us, we’re so football orientated,’ [Emirates President] said.”); Other 
“second-tier” sponsors followed suit. Scandal-hit FIFA lose three more major sponsors. 
Gibson, supra note 12. (“Three of Fifa’s sponsors during the 2014 World Cup in Brazil have 
joined Sony and Emirates in declining to renew their contracts with the scandal-hit world 
governing body. Castrol, Continental Tyres and Johnson & Johnson – so-called second-tier 
sponsors that had a high-profile presence in Brazil – have confirmed they have not renewed 
their deals.”). 
 51.  Alexander Smith, FIFA Corruption Scandal: Sponsors Visa, Coca-Cola Express 
Concern, NBC NEWS (May 28, 2015, 6:41 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fifa-
corruption-scandal/visa-coca-cola-mcdonalds-are-extremely-concerned-fifa-scandal-
n365806. 
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sponsorship deals.52 Nor did critics like Visa and Coca-Cola take any 
financial action or threaten any.53 
III. THE PITFALLS OF REGULATION BY CORPORATE SPONSORS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SPORTS ARENA 
The lack of response is in some tension with the significant 
potential of corporate sponsors to exert influence in this context, as 
discussed in some detail in Part I above. Both the IOC and FIFA are 
heavily financially dependent on their sponsors.54 The threat of lost 
sponsorship dollars was a threat that seems to have exerted real 
influence over the IOC in resolving the Salt Lake City scandal.55 Yet, 
the ability of sponsors to exert this influence is undermined by several 
significant obstacles, which likely explains the muted responses in 
both cases described in Part II. 
First, it has been speculated that FIFA sponsors whose contracts 
were not up for renewal may have been contractually prevented from 
withdrawing sponsorship or making strong public statements 
condemning the scandal as it was unfolding.56 According to this 
account, it is the corporate sponsors, not the sporting organization, 
whose behavior is more likely to be regulated by the contractual 
relationships between them.  
Although sponsorship contracts almost certainly have so-called 
“morals clauses” that would provide sponsors with the right to 
withdraw should certain types of scandals emerge, some experts have 
suggested that such clauses might not cover scandals in which 
individuals rather than the organization are the focus.57 That is, “[e]ven 
 
 52.  Mosendz, supra note 54. 
 53.  Phil Rosenthal, FIFA scandal statement: Visa, McDonald’s, others don’t run, won’t 
kick, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 29, 2015, 5:31 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/columnists/ct-rosenthal-fifa-corruption-0531-biz-
20150529-column.html; Darren Rovell, Corporate Sponsors yet to drop FIFA amid 
corruption investigations, ESPN FC (May 27, 2015), http://www.espnfc.us/fifa-world-
cup/story/2469265/corporate-sponsors-yet-to-drop-fifa-amid-corruption-probe. 
 54.  See de Moraes, supra note 7 & accompanying text. 
 55.  Larry Siddons, IOC expels six members in Salt Lake City scandal, THE GUARDIAN 
(March 17, 1999, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/1999/mar/17/ioc-expels-
members-bribes-scandal; see also Alex Altman, The Real Story of Romney’s Olympic 
Turnaroud, TIME (July 18, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/07/18/the-real-story-of-
romneys-olympic-turnaround/ (discussion about Romney being hailed for bringing in so many 
sponsor dollars in the aftermath of the scandal). 
 56.  Gosh, supra note 6. 
 57.  Id.  
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if multiple individuals are convicted, that may not be enough to trigger 
a morals clause.”58 More than likely, the contracts are drafted to be 
friendly to the organization and the morals clauses may be drafted to 
require “a criminal conviction actually involving” the organization.59  
Further, even if the clauses are not clear-cut in this respect, if there 
is an argument that a morals clause is not clearly triggered, the risk 
may seem to be too great for sponsors to undertake. If they are wrong 
in interpreting the morals clause to apply in a given case, there might 
“be significant financial consequences” in the form of potential 
“damages for breach of contract”—perhaps even equal to the value of 
the entire deal.60 The risk for the most financially invested would be 
the highest, thus handicapping those sponsors with the most potential 
influence.  
Second, the financial stakes may seem particularly high to 
sponsors given the lack of a clear upside to staking out a critical 
position. With respect to the FIFA scandal, Professor Jeroen 
Weijermars claims that  
consumers also seem to be quite indifferent. The Dutch press 
suggested that consumers stop buying any product sponsoring FIFA as 
a sign of rejection, but nothing happened. Moreover, consumers 
quickly forget: at the next World Cup, the ball will be put into play and 
it will again be one of the greatest sporting events.61  
He notes that, in general, “studies that show negative publicity 
causes little damage to a sponsor’s brand value.”62 
Given the probability that brand value will suffer little, sponsors 
may feel they are standing in a sweet spot if they take some steps to 
signal disapproval but not so much that they trigger the ire of the 
organization and a threatened action for breach. This is particularly 
true given the increasing importance many companies place on being 
viewed as a good corporate citizen.63 “A combination of media 
 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  Jeroen Weijermars, The sponsors’ reaction to FIFA case, JOHAN CRUYFF INST.: THE 
MAGAZINE, (June 02, 2015) http://johancruyffinstitute.com/en/blog-en/the-sponsors-reaction-
to-fifa-case/. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See Sarah Dadush, Profiting in (RED): The Need for Enhanced Transparency in 
Cause-Related Marketing, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1269, 1278 (2010) (discussing the 
importance of a company’s boosting its corporate social responsibility image and its sales). 
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pressure, social media commentary, and ‘sophisticated’ understanding 
of [corporate social responsibility (“CSR”)] means few of the brands 
are willing to stay completely quiet.”64 All of this is in line with the 
reality that “[s]ome sponsors have been more vocal than you’d expect, 
publicly.”65  
Third, structural obstacles may make it difficult for many if not 
most companies to do more. As noted above, strict contract provisions 
in FIFA sponsor contracts may tie the hands of sponsors to do much. 
To the extent there is little brand tarnishment associated with these 
scandals, the organization may stay in the driver’s seat in terms of 
contract negotiations – especially in situations where there are 
sponsors lined up to take a spot if one drops out. While sponsors may 
find themselves in a position to demand contract provisions that give 
them more power in the wake of a scandal—as several companies 
apparently did with the IOC at the tail end of the Salt Lake City 
scandal—this position may have changed significantly by the time the 
next renewal period comes around. Ultimately, unless brand 
tarnishment through association becomes a real issue, sponsors may 
not wield as much authority as their dollar contributions suggest they 
should. 
The CEO of John Hancock has also spoken directly to the issue 
of organizational obstacles that stand in the way of sponsors’ ability to 
exert real regulatory pressure, claiming that his background, which put 
him in a unique position to take the stance he did vis-à-vis the IOC 
during the Salt Lake City scandal, is unusual for a high-ranking 
corporate official.66 Specifically, he claims that sports sponsorship 
contracting is typically run out of divisions within a company headed 
by middle managers who are unlikely to have the status or incentives 
necessary to advocate for harsh sanctions.67 Moreover, unlike 
D’Alessandro himself who did exactly this, those who serve in those 
middle management jobs and have the expertise and knowledge of 
sponsorship deals generally do not move up the company “food chain” 
to positions where they might achieve such status.68 
 
 64.  Gosh, supra note 6. 
 65.  Id. (“It’s a trend that sponsors have become more prepared to stick their heads above 
the parapet and actively engage with the public conversation.”) (quoting Nick Johnson, board 
director for the European Sponsorship Association). 
 66.  Sachdev, supra note 49 (noting that David D’Alessandro, John Hancock’s CEO, was 
the most critical corporate backer of the IOC after the Salt Lake City scandal). 
 67.  Sandomir, supra note 8. 
 68.  Id. 
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Finally, even when they are in such a position to do something, 
sponsors’ regulatory efforts may not be as public as John Hancock’s 
were. Behind the scenes action may be deemed more effective—but 
would be hard to identify or measure.69 In general, both sides are likely 
to understand that “it could do more harm than good for the sponsors 
to quit” altogether and rescind their affiliation with the sporting 
organization.70 Where they maintain established relationships, they 
maintain leverage or influence. “[I]t’s going to be easier for them to 
work within existing parameters than for any new sponsor coming 
in.”71 Both the organization and sponsor may also be aware that the 
impact of sponsors’ potential departures might be muted or mooted to 
the extent competitors are easily lined up to take their spots.72 For 
instance, Emirates’ departure as a FIFA sponsor was quickly 
overshadowed by news that Qatar Airlines was already in line to take 
its place.73 
CONCLUSION 
John Hancock’s efforts to push the IOC to take action to clean 
house in the wake of the Salt Lake City bribery scandal appear to have 
been very effective at pushing the IOC to do just that. Unfortunately, 
the lack of broader sponsor efforts at that time, and tepid responses to 
the FIFA scandal, may reflect the existence of various impediments to 
effective corporate regulation of corruption more generally. While the 
success of John Hancock should encourage those who are looking for 
glimmers of hope in a difficult to regulate space, unpacking what made 
it successful and contrasting with more typical responses reveals that 
it is certainly no panacea or magic solution to lean more on the 
corporate sponsor community to combat corruption by these 
organizations.   
 
 
 69.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 55. 
 70.  Gosh, supra note 6. 
 71.  Id. (quoting Johnson). 
 72.  For example, as of July 2015, only months after the departure of major sponsors such 
as Emirates during the FIFA corruption scandal, Qatar Airways reported that it was in latter 
stages of negotiating a sponsorship agreement with FIFA (as a replacement for Emirates). 
Flanagan, supra note 13. 
 73.  Id. 
